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Abstract 
 
The notion of interdependent preferences has a long history in economic 
thought. It  can be found in the works of  authors such as Hume,  Rae, 
Genovesi,  Smith, Marx and Mill among others. In the 20th century, the idea 
became more widespread  mainly through the works of Veblen and 
Duesenberry. Recently, an increasing number of theorists are interested in 
issues like reference income, relative consumption and positional goods 
which are all based on the concept of interdependent preferences.  However, 
such preferences were never part of the corpus of orthodox theory. For 
instance,   although Pareto and Marshall were aware of their existence, they 
rejected their incorporation into economic theory. There were various reasons 
for this rejection. The structure of mainstream economic methodology might 
be one reason. Another reason had to do with the theoretical implications of 
adopting interdependent preferences.  The  paper discusses the  main 
historical aspects of this idea in relation to the mainstream resistance to 
incorporate it in orthodox economic theory.   
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The History of Mainstream Rejection of Interdependent 
Preferences  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of interdependent preferences, and its closely related 
notion of positional goods, are present in the works of a  substantial  number 
of eminent thinkers in the history of economic thought. One can even find the 
basis  of the above ideas in the theories of 18th century authors such as  A. 
Genovesi and  D. Hume and also in  a great number of classical economists  
such as  Smith, Ricardo, Marx,  Senior, Mill  and many others, who  discuss 
these issues in sympathetic terms. In addition, it plays a central role in the 
contributions  of many very well-known post-marginalist economists such as 
T. Veblen, A.C. Pigou and J. Duesenberry. In the last few years, there is a 
renewed interest in the idea especially in many macroeconomic and  labour 
papers and also in the relatively modern research area of subjective well-
being. Many theorists in the above fields have found that the incorporation of 
interdependent preferences can help explain a variety  of economic 
phenomena such as wage rigidity, savings patterns and the  Easterlin 
paradox (see Bruni, 2004; Drakopoulos, forthcoming).   
In spite of the above, it is still not accepted by the majority of 
mainstream economists who continue to assume independent individual 
preferences. There are a number of reasons for this attitude which have 
mainly to do with the methodological foundations of orthodox economics.  
More specifically, the notion of interdependent preferences was deliberately 
ignored by the founders of modern mainstream economics such as V. Pareto 
and A. Marshall.  Pareto  thought that interpersonal preferences were not part 
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of his definition of “logical action” in economics and  that their analysis 
belongs to sociology and not to economics. Marshall was aware of status-
driven consumption  but he condemned such expenditures, believing that they 
were rooted in personal vanity and created envy in others. Thus, Marshall’s 
and Pareto’s negative stance towards  incorporating the idea of interpersonal 
preferences can be seen as an important reason why such preferences did 
not become part of  the corpus of subsequent mainstream analysis and also 
of mainstream welfare economics. Orthodox reactions towards the work of J. 
Duesenberry on consumption theory, which is based on the idea of 
interdependent preferences, is  a more modern representative example of this 
stance. It seems that the mainstream methodological preconception against 
incorporating psychological and sociological elements in economic theory and 
also the methodological prevalence of economic agents characterized by 
selfish behaviour, were two crucial reasons for the negative mainstream 
attitude.   
The paper will start with a review of the presence of interdependent 
preferences in the history of economic ideas1. Namely, it will argue that the 
idea was present in the works of many pre-classical and classical economists. 
The next section will show that this presence continued in the work of 
theorists such as Veblen and Pigou who explored the analytical 
consequences of such preferences. The fourth section of the paper will 
discuss how  Pareto’s and Marshall’s  negative stance, contributed to the 
abandonment of such preferences from subsequent mainstream economic 
                                                 
1
 As in most cases of  history of ideas based discussion, the problem of  using contemporary 
terms retrospectively holds. The modern terms of  interdependent preferences and of 
positional goods that are the main terms used in this paper, are conceived in a broad sense to 
reflect  the general notion that individual preferences are constantly influenced by the 
preferences and actions of other individuals. 
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theorizing. The following section will discuss the mainstream attitude towards 
the work of Duesenberry as the main example of the continuation of 
mainstream disregard and also of the possible reasons for this. The sixth 
section will provide a brief discussion of  the more recent developments on 
this matter.  Finally, a concluding section will close the paper. 
 
 
2. Interdependent Preferences and Positional Goods in Pre-Classical 
and Classical Thought 
 
The general idea that individual preferences  are influenced by the 
preferences and actions of other individuals is based on the social nature of 
human beings. In fact, one can argue that the social nature of humans implies 
the behavioural importance of interdependent preferences and also of 
positional goods. Clearly, the social dimension of human nature is not a novel 
idea since it was first analyzed and emphasized by ancient thinkers and 
especially by Aristotle (for a review see Schneider 2007). In modern times, the 
Neapolitan    Antonio Genovesi (1713-68) is one of the first authors whose 
social and  economic thinking  is characterized by an  emphasis on the 
sociality of  human nature. As Genovesi puts it in an indicative statement:  
“We are created in such a way as to be touched necessarily, by a musical 
sympathy, by pleasure and internal satisfaction, as soon, as we meet 
another man no human being not even the most cruel and hardened can 
enjoy pleasures in which no one else participates” (Genovesi, 1766, 
quoted in Bruni, 2007, p.31). 
 
Furthermore, human sociality is seen as the main  function of society given 
that for  Genovesi  the chief advantage of society is not to be found in its 
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production of material goods, but in the enjoyment of social relationships 
(Bruni, 2007, p.31). 
Writing in the same period, Sir James Steuart’s economic work  can 
also be seen as having grasped the basis of interdependent preferences and 
positional goods. As he writes: “the moment  a person begins to live by his 
industry, let his livelihood be ever so poor, he immediately forms little objects 
of ambition, compares his situation with that of his fellows who are a degree 
above him, and considers a shade more of ease, ….. as an advancement, not 
of his happiness only, but also of his rank” (Steuart, 1767, p. 272). 
Furthermore, he seems to have anticipated the well-known concept of  
‘conspicuous consumption’.  
“Those, however, who are systematically luxurious, that is, from a 
formed taste and confirmed habit, are but few, in comparison of those 
who becomes so from levity, vanity, and the imitation of others. The 
last  are those who principally support and extend the system; but 
they are not the most incorrigible. Were it not for imitation, every age 
would seek after, and be satisfied with the gratification of natural 
desires” (Steuart ,1767, p. 244 also p. 61). 
 
D. Hume was well aware of the importance of  the social aspect of 
human behaviour. As he states: “The passions are so contagious, that they 
pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce 
correspondent movements in all human breasts” (Hume, 1736, p. 605). 
Similar to this,  is Hume’s strong objection to the universal assumption of self-
interest which implies autonomous and thus non-interdependence of  
individual preferences: 
“So far from thinking that men have no affection for anything beyond 
themselves, I am of opinion, that though it be rare to meet with one, who 
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loves any single person better than himself; yet ‘tis rare to meet with one in 
whom all the kind affections taken together, do not overbalance all the 
selfishness” (Hume, 1736, p.487). 
 
The idea that preferences are influenced by the preferences of other 
individuals can also be found in many classical economists. Adam Smith 
recognized that individuals engage in social comparisons. Apart from the  
natural human motives, such as  the "love of life", the "dread of dissolution", 
the "desire of the continuance and perpetuity of the species", etc. (Smith, 
1759, p. 77, ft), he also included   "the love of distinction" (1759, p. 50). The 
basis of  this motive is  the human "vanity which is  always founded upon the 
belief of our being the object of attention and approbation" (1759, p. 50), and 
is   "natural to man" (1759, p. 182). The idea of  comparison of our income to 
a class or group of individuals is also present in his thought (In modern terms, 
this idea is known as “keeping up with the Jones’s” ). In Smith’s words: 
“The desire of becoming the proper objects of this respect, of deserving 
and obtaining this credit and rank among our equals, is, perhaps, the 
strongest of all our desires, and our anxiety to obtain the advantages of 
fortune is accordingly much more excited and irritated by this desire, than 
by that of supplying all the necessities and conveniencies of the body, 
which are always very easily supplied" (Smith, 1759, pp. 212-3). 
 
Adam Smith’s contemporary,  John Rae was also well-aware of the 
power of consumption imitation. Rae’s ideas on the subject are quite similar 
with the ones expressed subsequently  by T. Veblen, although it is not clear if 
Veblen was aware of Rae’s work (see Edgell and Tilman, 1991). As Rae 
states:  
“Their [i.e. individuals] consumption is regulated, to a great degree, 
by the influence of the imitative propensity. We may form a near 
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guess whether a person is in the custom of drinking wine, or tea, or 
coffee, or smoking tobacco, from knowing the habits of his 
associates…[and] ….. Their consumption is also greatly regulated by 
the passion of vanity” (Rae , 1834, pp. 293-4). 
 
Rae also discusses further the idea of conspicuous consumption (influenced 
to a large extent by Adam Smith)2.  He attributed such behavior  to the 
selfishness and vanity of individuals: “It is not, indeed, to be disputed, that the 
rarity and costliness of the liquors, and other similar commodities consumed 
by an individual, may heighten greatly the absolute pleasure he derives from 
them. This arises from a trait in the character of man, which we have every 
day opportunities of observing. The attention is always roused in a greater 
degree by an object, when it excites more than one faculty” (Rae, 1834, p. 
268). Similarly, Rae seems to have distinguished between mere luxuries and 
what were to become known subsequently as ‘Giffen goods’. The demand for 
such goods falls if there is a considerable drop in their price: “Were pearls, or 
lace, to be got for one tenth of the labor that must now be given for them, they 
would go completely out of fashion” (Rae, 1834, pp. 270, 292).  
A. Cournot has a very similar approach to Rae’s observation that a fall 
in the price  of some luxury goods will certainly reduce their demand.  Cournot 
admitted that:  
“There are, in fact, some objects of whim and luxury which are only 
desirable on account of their rarity and of the high price which is the 
consequence thereof. If any one should succeed in carrying out cheaply 
the crystallization of carbon, and in producing for one franc the diamond 
which to-day is worth a thousand, it would not be astonishing if diamonds 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion of  the concept of conspicuous consumption in economic thought, see 
Mayhew, 2002. 
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should cease to be used in sets of jewellery, and should disappear as 
articles of commerce. In this case a great fall in price would almost 
annihilate the demand” (Cournot 1927, p. 38). 
 
R. Whately argued (1832, p. 51) that the level of consumption and of 
the  consumption pattern is socially determined. The notion of interpersonal 
preferences is present when he argues that  “an individual man  is called 
luxurious, in comparison with other men, of the same community and in the 
same walk of life with himself” (Whately, 1832, p. 53). Similarly, M.  Longfield 
advances the argument that "the wages of the labourer depend upon the 
expense of his maintenance and usual style of his living, instead of his 
expenses and his mode of living depending pretty much upon his wage" 
(Longfield, 1834, p. 203). 
Nassau Senior in his Outline of the Science of Political Economy drew 
attention to what he called “the desire for distinction”. Having discussed the 
desire for variety, and having attributed to it the diminishing utility to be gained 
from each additional unit of a particular commodity consumed, Senior 
unequivocally declared it to be less powerful than the desire for distinction:  
“But strong as is the desire for variety, it is weak compared with the 
desire for distinction: a feeling which, if we consider its universality and 
its constancy, that it affects all men and at all times, that it comes with us 
from the cradle, and never leaves us till we go to the grave, may be 
pronounced to be the most powerful of human passions. The most 
obvious source of distinction is the possession of superior wealth” 
(Senior, 1836, p. 12).  
 
Senior makes clear that the main effect of the motive for distinction is to 
influence the rate of demand and utility of special goods of high exchange 
value, such as diamonds (Senior, 1836, p. 13). 
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One can maintain that  Marx had also conceived the idea of relative 
income and consumption and in general, of the concept of positional goods. 
Hence the quotation  “let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks 
from a little house to a hut” (Marx, 1849, p. 216).  Furthermore, there are other 
passages where the notion of rising immiseration in spite of the rising real 
wages is also present (see also Hollander, 1984, p. 146).  
J. S. Mill points out that once a basic standard of living has been 
achieved, the concern about social status becomes extremely strong. The 
subsequent notion of positional goods  is present in the following passage:  
“When once the means of living have been obtained, the far greater part 
of the remaining labour and effort which takes place on earth, has for its 
object to acquire the respect or favourable regard of mankind; to be 
looked up to, or at all events, not to be looked down upon by them” (Mill 
1874, p. 411). 
 
Finally, by the end of the 19th century, Henry Cunynghame provided 
the  first attempt to illustrate diagrammatically the effect of incorporating 
dependence of one individual’s demand for a good on that of others, in his 
1892 article entitled Some Improvements in Simple Geometrical Methods of 
Treating Exchange Value, Monopoly, and Rent. In introducing this new 
diagram, Cunynghame observed:  
“… almost the whole value of strawberries in March, to those who like 
this tasteless mode of ostentation, is the fact that others cannot get 
them. As my landlady once remarked, ‘Surely, sir, you would not like 
anything so common and cheap as a fresh herring?’. The demand for 
diamonds, rubies, and sapphires is another example of this. As the 
number increases, not only does the price go down, but the very 
pleasure of those who already have them is decreased by their 
becoming common” (Cunynghame 1892, p. 37).  
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Cunynghame’s diagram showed a consumer surplus curve lying below the 
commodity demand curve, but shifting upwards for every reduction in the 
quantity supplied.  
Thus, as our previous discussion indicated, interpersonal comparisons 
and positional goods were concepts which were present in the economic 
thought of the 18th and especially 19th centuries. It has to be noted that for 
most of the authors discussed, the above ideas were not part of a systematic 
theory of individual economic behaviour. To a large extent this was due to 
their adherence to a cost of production theory of value. This implies that a full 
theory of individual preferences was not a necessary part for the construction 
of economic theories. A more systematic discussion of these ideas, however, 
became apparent with a shift towards a more subjective approach to the 
theory of value which took place in the last decades of the 19th century.  But 
before we proceed to this theme,  let us see first the more systematic 
discussion of  interdependent preferences in the works of  T. Veblen and A.C. 
Pigou. 
 
3. Veblen and Pigou 
 
Interdependent preferences and positional goods are central ideas  in 
Thorstein  Veblen’s main work. A substantial analysis of these concepts and 
of their impact can be found in his  The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899). 
These concepts played such a  fundamental  role in his analysis  that they 
were conceived as the foundation of  a private property society.   In the 
following statement Veblen  combines many aspects of the previous 
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discussion. Namely, he links  consumption and wealth imitation, private 
property and the nature and effect of positional goods:     
“The motive that lies at the root of ownership is emulation; and the same 
motive of emulation continues active in the further development of the 
institution to which it has given rise and in the development of all those 
features of the social structure which the institution of ownership 
touches. The possession of wealth confers honour; it is an invidious 
distinction. Nothing equally cogent can be said for the consumption of 
goods, nor for any other conceivable incentive to acquisition, and 
especially not for any incentive to the accumulation of wealth. … the end 
sought by accumulation is to rank high in comparison with the rest of the 
community in point of pecuniary strength. So long as the comparison is 
distinctly unfavourable to himself, the normal, average individual will live 
in chronic dissatisfaction with his present lot; and when he has reached 
what may be called the normal pecuniary standard of the community, or 
of his class in the community, this chronic dissatisfaction will give place 
to a restless straining to place a wider and ever-widening pecuniary 
interval between himself and this average standard” (Veblen 1899, pp. 
25-6, 31-2).  
 
Veblen’s famous term, “conspicuous consumption”, is obviously related  
to the above. In particular, conspicuous consumption is the  consumption of 
luxuries that is observed by others, sometimes by these others participating in 
it.  Conspicuous consumption is not confined to the  “rich”, or to the  leisure 
class in Veblen’s terminology. Other social classes might also engage in such 
activity, even the  lower classes. As he states: 
“[n]o class of society, not even the most abjectly poor, foregoes all 
customary conspicuous consumption. … There is no class and no 
country that has yielded so abjectly before the pressure of physical want 
as to deny themselves all gratification of this higher or spiritual need” 
(Veblen 1899, p. 85).  
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It is clear that in Veblen’s  theoretical analysis,  the idea of interpersonal 
comparisons of income, consumption and wealth are extremely important 
factors for economic and social relationships. 
 Although Veblen’s  ideas as a whole were not very influential for the 
emerging corpus of mainstream theory, the notion of interpersonal 
preferences was not uncommon among leading economists at the time. This 
can be seen in the work of  A.C.  Pigou whose ideas were in the centre of  
mainstream economics of that period. Pigou  devotes considerable space to 
the concepts of  interdependent preferences and positional goods. He  is 
clearly influenced by Pareto’s differentiation between the terms ‘ophelimity’ 
and ‘utility’, which we will examine in the next section. In his words: 
“The curve of the private marginal demand prices lies above the curve of 
collective marginal demand prices if an addition to the consumption of 
one consumer diminishes the ophelimity associated with a given 
consumption by other consumers … The curve of the private marginal 
demand prices lies below the curve of collective marginal demand prices 
if an addition to the consumption of one consumer increases the 
ophelimity associated with a given consumption by other consumers” 
(Pigou 1910, p. 361). 
 
The inequality between private and collective demand prices depends on the 
emergence of a social element to individuals’ states of consciousness 
because some or all consumers of a particular product derive utility from their 
direct consumption as well as consumption by third-parties (see also Mclure, 
2009). This is closely linked to his previous analysis in his   ‘Some remarks on 
utility’ (Pigou, 1903) where he  introduces the argument K{a,b} as an element 
within the individual’s utility function of a specific commodity. More 
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specifically,  U  = f (...,K{a,b}) , where K{a,b} is a ‘complex expression’ in 
which the elements a, is the quantity of A possessed by the individual’s first 
neighbour and b is the ‘distance’ from an individual to his/her first neighbour. If 
the consumption of good A by neighbours has no effect on the ophelimity 
enjoyed by an individual from his/her consumption of good A, the ‘distance’ b 
is zero and thus  the value of the complex expression is zero. However,  when 
the consumption of good A by neighbours influences the ophelimity that an 
individual enjoys from his/her consumption of good A, the ‘distance’ in each of 
the elements b is non-zero and the value of the complex expression is non-
zero. Pigou  is clearly influenced by Cunynghame (1892), that people who like 
a tasteless mode of ostentation receive diminished pleasure from some 
commodities when they become more ‘common’ (for an extensive discussion, 
see Mclure, 2009).  
 
 
4.   Pareto, Marshall and  the Rejection 
 
 
As was seen in the previous sections,  the concepts of interdependent 
preferences and positional goods were part of the economic thinking of a 
great number of influential theorists. However, the marginalist emphasis on 
the subjective theory of value required a systematic model of individual 
economic decision-making. Thus the issue of the nature of  preferences had 
to be addressed.  Vilfredo Pareto was the first major economist who  provided 
the rational for the  irrelevance of  interdependent preferences for economic 
analysis and thus contributed to their rejection from mainstream economics.  
The basis of Pareto’s approach to preferences are the distinct concepts 
of  ophelimity and utility. For Pareto, the term utility has a general character 
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while the term ophelimity is more specialized to the purposes of economics. 
Economic man is conceived as a rational being in the sense of means-ends 
relationship. This rationality can be achieved through trial and error process. 
Economic man  responds only to forces ophelimity (Pareto 1896, p. 12).  In 
this conceptual framework, individual preferences are  independent. Although 
Pareto admits  that man’s character presents other characteristics too,  these 
are studied by other sciences. Once an individual’s preferences are 
influenced by interaction with the actions and ideas of third-parties, action is 
considered with respect to utility and not ophelimity (McLure, 2009). In  a 
subsequent article,  Pareto (1918)  is more specific about the two scientific 
domains, in the sense that when the ‘economic part’ of the economic 
phenomena dominates, analysis should primarily be based on economic 
theory; and when the ‘sociological part’ of the economic phenomena 
dominates, analysis should primarily be based on sociology  (see also 
McLure, 2009).   
It is evident that   Pareto’s rejection of interdependent preferences had 
a methodological motive. Pareto  was extremely influenced by the prevailing 
positivist scientific philosophy, a basic characteristic of which, was the 
exclusion of all ‘metaphysical’ and ‘non-scientific’ elements from economics. 
Pareto’s methodological ideal of  economics was that it should be  a 
mathematical science, part of the natural sciences such as physiology and 
chemistry (Pareto, 1896, p.21). This implies that  economics should be freed 
from any sociological or psychological ideas which hamper the application of 
the positivist methodology (for an extensive discussion, see Seligman, 1969; 
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Drakopoulos, 1997). Pareto’s model of rational economic man outlined above, 
excludes social influences such as interpersonal preferences.  
Alfred  Marshall’s influence on the formation of modern mainstream 
microeconomics is widely recognized. Marshall was aware of  consumption 
for the purposes of status,  but he condemned such behaviour basically on 
ethical grounds: 
“There is some misuse of wealth in all ranks of society. And though, 
speaking generally, we may say that every increase in the wealth of the 
working classes adds to the fullness and nobility of human life, because 
it is used chiefly in the satisfaction of real wants; yet even among the 
artisans in England, and perhaps still more in new countries, there are 
signs of the growth of that unwholesome desire for wealth as a means of 
display which has been the chief bane of the well-to-do classes in every 
civilized country. Laws against luxury have been futile; but it would be a 
gain if the moral sentiment of the community could induce people to 
avoid all sorts of display of individual wealth. There are indeed true and 
worthy pleasures to be got from wisely ordered magnificence: but they 
are at their best when free from any taint of personal vanity on the one 
side and envy on the other.” (Marshall, 1890, book III, ch. VI). 
 
Thus, Marshall effectively refused to consider further status-driven 
consumption. Moreover, he was reluctant to discuss the general case of 
interpersonal effects on demand mainly because it would have called into 
question the  fundamental assumption of the standard theory, that aggregate 
demand could be derived from the simple addition of individual  demand 
schedules (Mason, 1995). Although a number of authors such as 
Cunynghame (1892) and Foley (1893) clearly pointed this lack concerning 
status driven consumption, Marshall effectively ignored these criticisms and 
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did not analyse the issue further in subsequent editions of his Principles (see 
also Mason, 1995). 
 In general, Pareto and Marshall, two extremely dominant figures for the 
formation of mainstream economics, had a negative attitude towards 
incorporating interdependent preferences in economic analysis. Pareto’s 
extremely influential methodological ideas against including sociological and 
psychological elements in economics, and Marshall’s explicit refusal to accept 
their role, seem to be important reasons for the mainstream rejection. Thus, 
by the first decades of the 20th century, the idea of interdependent 
preferences had been  effectively marginalized from mainstream economic 
analysis although it had a constant presence in the earlier history of economic 
thought.  
 
5. J. Duesenberry and the Reappearance of Interdependent Preferences  
 
The next major analytical use of the concept of interdependent 
preferences appeared in  James Duesenberry’s  main book published in 
1949. One can view Duesenberry’s work as a continuation of Veblen’s, given 
that there are many common points concerning income and consumption 
comparisons, and also of the role of the demonstration effect (see  
McCormick, 1983).  In particular, Duesenberry is known as the proponent of 
the relative consumption hypothesis, the basic idea of which was that  ”any 
particular  consumer will be influenced by consumption of people with whom 
he has social contacts” (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 48). This idea (labeled as the 
demonstration effect) questioned the established mainstream view that 
absolute levels of income only determine patterns of consumer demand 
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(Duesenberry, 1949, p. 27). Duesenberry proceeded further to analyze the 
basis of such behaviour. As he writes: 
“We can maintain then that the frequency and strength of impulses to 
increase expenditure depends on frequency of contact with goods 
superior to those habitually consumed. This effect need not depend at all 
on considerations of emulation or ‘conspicuous consumption’” 
(Duesenberry 1949, p. 27-28). 
 
Duesenberry’s consumption approach shows how levels of 
expenditure could be increased not by changes in income or prices, but by 
following the consumption expenditures of others with whom the individual 
had contacts (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 29). This implies serious consequences 
for a number of important theoretical issues like  the pattern of savings and 
growth as  Duesenberry himself intended. In this framework,  savings rates 
depend  on the position of income distribution and not exclusively on the 
income level, as in a traditional savings function.  
However, much in the same way as the previous approaches on 
interdependent preferences,  Duesenberry’s ideas  never gained popularity 
among mainstream theorists. As was discussed previously, this was partly 
due to the established orthodox conceptual framework which was hostile to 
interpersonal preferences. However, there appeared some new forms of 
reaction which were more specific. One type of reaction against the inclusion 
of such preferences was to diminish their theoretical importance.3 Robert 
Clower’s stance a few years  after Duesenberry’s publication,  is indicative: 
 
                                                 
3
 Many theorists have shown that interdependent preferences and demonstration effects have 
significant theoretical importance and  produce different results and policy implications. See 
also the discussion in the following sections, and for a relatively early paper pointing out the 
differences, Pollak, 1976).  
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“Interdependent preferences analysis differs but little from ordinary 
consumption theory; hence, while one sometimes gets different and 
slightly more general results in “interdependent” as compared with 
“independent” preference analysis, it is only in this very limited and 
practically unimportant sense that the two kinds of theory may be said 
to be at variance with one another” (Clower, 1951, p.178). 
 
The position of  Modigliani and Brumberg towards interdependent 
preferences, and more specifically towards their specific expression in 
Duesenberry’s analysis,  was somewhat different from Clower’s. Although, 
initially, Modigliani (1949) embraced this idea in his own research 
concerning relative income effects on consumption,  he was much more 
critical later on arguing that it contained  unnecessary   social and 
psychological elements. Instead, they claimed that their (Modigliani and 
Brumberg’s)  new interpretation of consumption theory was sounder and 
much simpler (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954, p.424; Mason, 2000).  
 In the same period, Milton Friedman attacked Duesenberry’s 
formulations by claiming that permanent income rather than relative income 
was the basis of consumer behaviour. Although Friedman acknowledged 
some merit in Duesenberry’s concept of relative income, he argued that it 
was basically only a biased index of relative permanent income status. 
Furthermore, Friedman believed that his approach was superior, since it 
owed nothing to sociology or to psychology in contrast to Duesenberry’s  
which was full of subjective elements (Friedman, 1957; Mason, 2000).   
Thus, interpersonal preferences were once again excluded from the 
mainstream corpus of economic theory. One basic reason for this, as is 
inferred from Modigliani, Brumberg and Friedman,  is that Duesenberry’s 
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analysis poses some fundamental questions regarding the cultural influences 
on economic decisions and the endogeneity of preferences, issues which 
were not popular for orthodox theorists.  Thus, it  seems that  allegedly 
simpler and more “economic”  explanations of consumption patterns offered 
by Modigliani, Brumberg  and Friedman were preferred to Duesenberry’s 
sophisticated approach (see also Harbaugh, 1996; Cowling, 2006). Another  
important reason for the lack of acceptance of his ideas was the serious 
problems that they posed for the conventional demand theory which assumes 
that individual consumption behaviour was independent of the consumption of 
others. First, the inclusion of ‘demonstration effects’ in standard consumption 
theory would have made demand and consumption measurement far more 
complex4. Furthermore, during the same period, Samuelson’s (1947) revealed 
preference theory was gaining wide acceptance as a more ‘scientific’ 
approach based on observed behaviour  than the traditional  utility approach. 
However, many theorists suspected that  the standard approach to individual 
demand functions based on  revealed preference theory would be  
problematic if we take into account interdependent preferences (for an 
extensive discussion, see Holländer, 2001). 
 
6. Recent Developments 
For many years after its analytical treatment in the work of 
Duesenberry, the concept of interdependent preferences was again effectively 
ignored by the mainstream corpus of economic theory. According to R. Frank 
                                                 
4
 It has been argued that Duesenberry’s  sociological interpretations of consumption posed a 
recognizable threat to purely econometric treatments of consumer demand and of 
consumption patterns (Mason, 2000, pp. 561-62). 
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the rejection of Duesenberry’s relative income hypothesis “seems yet another 
testament to the power of a priori beliefs held by most economists” (Frank, 
1985a, p. 111). The notion was utilized though, by a few notable economists 
like  Harvey Leibenstein, (1950)  where the interdependence  of individual 
preference functions is called the “bandwagon effect”, by  Tibor Scitovsky 
(1962) who attacked the mainstream notion of consumer sovereignty and thus 
of independent preferences, by J.K. Galbraith (1969) who  built on many of 
Veblen's insights into consumer interdependence, conspicuous consumption 
and competitive emulation, and by Fred Hirsch  (1976) who introduced the 
concept of positional consumption and positional goods. Furthermore,  non-
mainstream schools  such as the Institutionalist, Behavioural and Post-
Keynesian schools also continued to pay attention to the idea (for an 
extensive review, see Drakopoulos, forthcoming). However, the vast majority 
of mainstream economists still treated individual preferences as independent.
 In the last two decades though, the research potential of interpersonal 
preferences has started to be realized by an increasing number of economists 
and thus it has begun to re-appear in some economic literature. There is an 
increasing use of ideas such as reference income, target income, relative 
consumption, positional goods and social status which are all based on the 
concept of interdependent preferences (for a recent review, see Truyts, 2010). 
The subfields of macro and labour economics are indicative examples. In 
particular, the idea that unions and workers compare income or wages with 
others has been expressed in a plethora of terms such as relative wage, fair 
wage,  aspiration wage, comparison or target wage  [see for instance, Frank 
(1984), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Clark and Oswald (1996), Charness and 
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Grosskopf (2001)]. Furthermore, in the last two decades the notion of 
comparison income has also entered the job satisfaction literature and more 
recently the quite fashionable subfield of happiness research, mainly in 
formulations examining the relationship between income and happiness level 
(e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1996, Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Drakopoulos, 2008). In 
spite of the above, the concept  with its specific expression of comparison 
income or interdependent utilities, is still not accepted by the economics 
orthodoxy.          
 One can argue that there are some apparent reasons for the 
continuous mainstream resistance towards interdependent preferences. One 
of these reasons might have to do with  their serious  theoretical 
consequences. A number of authors have shown that that the full 
incorporation of interdependent preferences, and of the related concept of the 
comparison or relative income, in economic theory, would cast considerable 
doubts on many well-established and important theoretical results. Namely, 
optimal taxation, economic growth and income distribution theories might 
need serious rethinking towards more progressive taxation and more 
emphasis on more equal income distribution (for reviews, see Dugger, 1985; 
Postlewaite, 1998; Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008, and  for the  implications 
of interdependent preferences for general equilibrium, see Ackerman, 1997).
 Another reason for the rejection of interdependent preferences has to 
do with the orthodox conception that economic agents are characterized by 
selfish preferences. In fact, self-interest was one of the cornerstones of the 
traditional model of individual economic behaviour (economic man). This is 
certainly still the case for many modern standard formulations. As R. Frank 
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observes: “To many economists, the notion of consumers being strongly 
influenced by demonstration effects must have seemed troublingly 
inconsistent with the reasoned pursuit of self-interest, if not completely 
irrational” (Frank, 1985b, p.146). Mainstream resistance to question self-
interested behaviour is still very strong in spite of abundant  research 
indicating otherwise (see for instance, Andreoni, 1995). The assumption is so 
embedded in mainstream theorizing that  as Rabin points out “A remarkable 
amount of energy has been devoted to giving self-interested explanations for 
laboratory behaviour that seems to be a departure from self-interest” (Rabbin, 
2002, p.667).         
 Finally, another reason which is closely linked to the above is that 
mainstream economists are still extremely reluctant to consider psychological 
and sociological  aspects of human behaviour in their economic analysis. 
Concepts such as social status, positional goods, rank concerns and 
consumer conformism which are all based on interdependent preferences, are 
thought by many mainstream theorists as not belonging to the realm of 
economic analysis. The ‘economic’ approach to human behaviour is seen as 
extremely successful and superior compared to other social sciences. Gary  
Becker’s definition of the economic approach is indicative of this attitude: “The 
combined assumptions of maximizing behaviour, market equilibrium and 
stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the 
economic approach … provides a valuable unified framework for 
understanding all human behavior” (Becker, 1976, p.5). Although Becker’s 
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statement was made more than three decades ago, most mainstream 
economists still adhere to it (see also Rabin, 2002).5 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
The notion of interdependent preferences and positional goods has 
had a long presence in the history of economic ideas. Our discussion showed 
that it was present in the works of many 18th and 19th centuries authors like A. 
Genovesi, D. Hume,  J. Rae,  A. Smith, K. Marx and J. S. Mill among others. It 
was also seen that the idea played an important role  in the works of  T. 
Veblen and A.C. Pigou. By the turn of the 20th century however, V. Pareto’s 
and A. Marshall’s negative stances did not favour  its further incorporation in 
mainstream economics. The main reason for this was the gradual 
establishment of  methodological ideas  which were clearly against the  
inclusion of sociological and psychological elements in economics. This was 
deemed to be essential for the drive of establishing a ‘positive’ economic 
science. After, WWII the concept of  interpersonal preferences regained some 
momentum mainly in the work of J. Duesenberry on consumption theory. 
However, Duesenberry’s approach was also ignored in favour of allegedly 
more ‘simple’ and ‘sound’ consumption theories.  
In the last two decades, there seems to be a renewed interest in the 
notion by some labour economists and also by theorists in the relatively new 
subfield of the economics of  subjective well-being, mainly because of its 
research potential towards analysing and explaining numerous contemporary 
                                                 
5
 It has to be noted here that in the last decade there is a rise in the interest in psychology by 
mainstream economists. This is basically due to the impact of the “New Behavioural 
Economics” which seems to have a greater influence than the “Old Behavioural Economics”   
(for an extensive discussion, see Sent, 2004). 
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economic issues. Still, however, mainstream  economists  are not willing to 
abandon the notion of  agents characterized by  independent preferences.  
Our discussion indicated that there are some basic reasons which 
might account for the continuous resistance to incorporate interdependent  
preferences in mainstream economic theory.  The traditional refusal to accept 
the role of psychological and sociological dimensions of economic behaviour 
might be seen as an important reason. This is connected to the standard 
conception of economic agents as selfish utility maximizers which implies 
independent preferences. Clearly, this is due to the methodological 
foundations of mainstream economics which can be traced to the emergence 
of the marginalist school. The other reason was the serious problems that 
interdependent preferences posed for the conventional aggregate demand 
theory. Many contemporary mainstream theorists have realized that many 
well established theoretical results might need serious rethinking if 
preferences are not independent. Thus, our discussion of the history of 
interdependent preferences indicates that the old methodological mainstream 
preconceptions concerning human behaviour and ‘positive’ economics, are 
still extremely strong. 
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